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Auctions for Renewable Energy Support - AURES - is a coordination and support action financed by the 
European Commission under the Horizon 2020 program to improve the implementation of renewable energy 
policies in EU Member States.  
AURES was conceived by the need of implementing market-based instruments including competitive bidding 
processes (i.e. auctions or tenders) to allocate support for renewable energy sources (RES) in the European 
electricity sector from 2015 onwards as stipulated in the EC State Aid Guidelines.  
Many European countries have by now undertaken competitive auctions for different technologies with mixed 
experiences while others have recently started or are at the verge of starting the implementation process. 
Energy community countries may also soon introduce competition for support payments. Therefore, there 
exists the need for capacity building of policy makers and market participants to successfully design, 
implement and use auctions for RES support. 
AURES ran from January 2015 to December 2017 and has generated new insights on the applicability of 
auctions for renewable support and on specific auction designs under different market conditions and policy 
goals in European countries. These insights are based on theoretical and empirical analysis (energy auctions 
in 12 European countries and 8 non-European countries), the use of state of the art simulation models and 
experiments, and through cooperation cases with some Member States providing tailor-made policy support 
in the implementation of auctions.  
AURES contributed to a strong knowledge-sharing with workshops, webinars, bi- and multilateral meetings, 
an interactive website and dedicated auction tools (AURES cash flow model and AURES auction designer). 
This final report covers a discussion of major findings and insights in regards to auction designs that AURES 
has identified to be relevant in the context of renewable energy.  
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1 Introduction: auctions for renewable energy support  
Auctions for renewable energy (RES) support are market-based, competitive bidding processes to identify the 
most appropriate RES projects to be constructed within a certain time frame and geographical area and to 
allocate appropriate support payments to these 
projects. A RES auction is a procurement 
auction, where typically a certain amount of 
power (MW) or energy (MWh) of renewables 
are offered up for bidding. Bidders compete to 
be allowed to deliver these volumes on basis 
of their required support level (often a premium 
in EUR/MWh). The projects with the lowest 
required support levels typically win the 
auction. Winners are then granted the right to 
construct their RES projects and the right to 
receive support payments for these projects for 
a given period of time. 
Competitive bidding processes are actively 
demanded by the European Commission as 
RES support allocation instrument (EC State 
Aid Guidelines1). During the past years, we have seen a steep increase in the use of RES auctions in many 
countries in Europe (see Figure 1), as well as in other countries around the world. 
There are two main arguments for the use of RES auctions: First, they allow an efficient allocation of support 
at a support level that is competitively determined and timely updated. Second, they allow for non-
discriminatory volume control of RES deployment and thus control of total support budgets. As with other RES 
support schemes, the success of auctions, and whether they can fulfil expectations regarding e.g. efficiency 
gains (i.e. lowest cost deployment), depends on the design elements chosen and how well they address 
specific characteristics of technology and market.  
Although more and more experience is generated by using auctions as support allocation instrument, a 
number of questions have not been univocally answered yet. These questions include: When are RES 
auctions a good idea, i.e. under which circumstances are they preferable to e.g. administratively set tariffs or 
quotas? How should RES auctions be designed to achieve desired outcomes? What design options exist? 
What are their benefits and challenges? Which design should be chosen for a particular auction 
implementation depending on certain policy goals and market situation? Answering these questions was the 
focus of the AURES project. This report summarises some of the major findings from the past three years. 
 
 
                                                     
1 European Commission guidance for the design of renewables support schemes (2014): Guidelines on State aid for environmental 
protection and energy 2014-2020. link  
Figure 1: Use of RES auctions in Europe (Ecofys 2017) 
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POLICY DECISIONS THAT INFLUENCE  
THE DESIGN OF A RES AUCTION 
MARKET CHARACTERISTICS THAT INFLUENCE 
THE DESIGN OF A RES AUCTION 
Technology focus (single technology, technology 
baskets or technology neutral (open to all)) 
Deployment target for at least the next five years 
Planned auction volume (capacities, generation or 
budget) and how this relates to the deployment target 
Remuneration type in the auction (in terms of 
implications, e.g. on winner’s curse) 
Resources of the auctioneer (sufficient for complex 
design and monitoring?) 
 
Expected market potential (project pipeline) and how this 
relates to the auction volume (next round and long term 
schedule) 
Average project size (per technology) and how this 
relates to auction volume and frequency (number of 
auction rounds per year) 
Expected number of bidders and bids 
Distribution of project costs among bidders (how 
asymmetric, systematically different project costs are) 
Relative strengths of bidders and how familiar they are 
with each other (how well they can assess each other’s 
cost) 
 
  
GENERAL AUCTION DESIGN ELEMENTS RES-SPECIFIC AUCTION DESIGN ELEMENTS
Selection criteria
Price-only 
Multi-criteria (tenders)
Scope
Auction volume
Periodicity (number and frequency of rounds)
Target achievement safeguards (dealing with amounts not awarded/built)
Penalties 
Penalising non-compliance
Penalising delays 
Other 
Seller concentration rules
Information provision
Web-based vs. in-person
Secondary market
Diversity
Technological diversity 
Size diversity 
Geographical diversity 
Actor diversity 
Other diversity types
Prequalification criteria
Technical requirements 
Documentation requirements 
Preliminary licences
Deposits and other guarantees
Financial capability requirements
Experience   
Support 
Remuneration type (energy or capacity-related) 
Duration of contract 
Updating of remuneration over time
Other 
Local content rules
Deadlines and grace periods
Auction format
Single-item
Multi-item (homogenous or heterogeneous)
Auction type
Sealed-bid (static auctions)
Descending clock (dynamic auctions)
Hybrid designs
Pricing rule
Pay-as-bid (in single-item auctions: first price) 
Vickrey (in single-item auctions: second price)
Uniform price
Price limits
Price ceilings 
Minimum prices
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2 Before we start: a word of caution 
Renewable energy auctions have been shown to be an important policy instrument for allocating renewable 
energy support and setting appropriate support levels. However, auctions are no panacea, i.e. they are not 
the ‘golden bullet’ that is superior to any other support allocation mechanism at any time. 
The use of auctions has several implications that are new in RES policy making: They introduce direct and 
immediate competition between favourable RES projects. It is in the nature of competitive allocation 
mechanisms that not all ‘good’ projects can be developed – competition can only be sufficient if there are 
more bids of strong projects than demand for them. The renewable energy sector is thus forced to move from 
being rather ‘technocratic’ developers, where everyone optimises their own projects, into being ‘strategic’ 
developers, where the success of one’s projects depends on the strength of others. This can become a 
challenge for policy makers: They now have to take care of 1) ensuring sufficient competition for a well-
functioning price formation, 2) avoiding undesired strategic incentives, collusion2 and other market distortions, 
and importantly 3) dealing with risk of low realisation rates, e.g. caused by underbidding or the existence of 
non-cost barriers (such as timing or permits).  
Often, the specific design solutions for these issues are highly context-specific and what works in one market 
is not necessarily applicable to another. In addition, different design elements might mitigate some issues but 
affect other factors, e.g. pre-qualification rules and penalties can increase realisation rates but can also 
increase the risk and thus the costs for bidders. In addition, policy makers often pursue other policy goals 
(secondary objectives) with energy support policy, e.g. increasing security of supply or encouraging actor 
diversity. Finding a compromise between encouraging different policy goals without compromising on well-
functioning price formation proves to be a challenging task. 
For this reason, the AURES project does not offer simple prescriptions of the ‘best’ auction design. It offers a 
framework for evaluation, insights on suitable design options, including their benefits and challenges, as well 
as results of modelling, simulating, experimenting and analysing different auction designs. The project also 
shares experiences from past, ongoing and future auction implementations, including specific and general 
lessons learnt. We do derive some general good practices, which are listed in the end of this report. 
The evaluation framework applied in the AURES project uses seven different dimensions, or success criteria. 
All auction assessment in this project is based on these dimensions, namely effectiveness, static efficiency, 
dynamic efficiency, support costs, legal feasibility, socio-political feasibility and local impacts (for more detail 
see del Río et al., 2015a3). The weight and importance of each of these dimensions in assessing the 
successfulness of an auction is a matter of policy preferences. There is no ‘perfect’ or standard set of 
assessment criteria to measure success. 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 Collusion: bidders communicating with each other without the knowledge of the auctioneer in order to obtain an auction outcome more 
favourable to them. While explicit collusion is commonly prohibited by law, implicit collusion can be observed in real-world applications, 
i.e. by bidders trying to communicate via hidden clues. 
3 del Río et al. (2015a): Overview of Design Elements for RES-E Auctions. AURES report D2.2 (a). link 
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3 To auction or not to auction: When are RES auctions 
actually a good idea? 
Despite their success in a range of contexts, auctions should not be seen as a one-size-fits-all policy 
prescription. There are a few situations in which an auction may not be appropriate and alternative or 
complementary policies should be considered. There is a strong empirical basis for considering alternatives in 
situations where reasonable competition cannot be expected, project costs are especially uncertain or policy 
goals other than lowest cost, such as actor diversity, are being pursued. These criteria are often met when 
policy makers are seeking to promote immature or innovative RES technologies. 
This empirical insight is supported by our theoretical work in Kitzing et al. (2016a)4, which shows that small 
markets are best supported by means other than auctions. The EC State Aid Guidelines5 that encourage 
Member States to adopt auctions offer a number of exemptions broadly in line with this analysis, as long as 
the Member State applying for the exemption can demonstrate that the alternative policy instrument does not 
over-compensate the energy producer. 
To aid selection of alternatives, in del Río et al. (2016a)6 the full range of alternative instruments and designs 
are evaluated against the above mentioned criteria of efficiency, cost containment and market integration that 
can be used to evaluate RES support. It is shown that there are ample design features that can be applied to 
instruments such as feed-in premiums to fulfil the same criteria as auctions, but there are also trade-offs and 
conflicts between criteria and care must be taken to match the design with its context and policy goals. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 
AUCTIONS 
Can be effective at meeting policy goals 
under the right conditions. However, 
small markets and immature 
technologies may require exemption. 
Consider employing alternative 
instruments in small markets and for 
immature technologies. 
ADMINISTRATIVELY 
SET SUPPORT 
 (such as feed-in tariffs) 
May be more appropriate in some 
situations (such as small markets and 
immature technologies). 
When using administratively set 
support, ensure that appropriate cost 
and volume control is implemented (if 
desired) through careful design. 
OTHER MARKET-
BASED SUPPORT 
(such as certificates) 
Promises some of the static efficiency 
benefit of auctions but often complex to 
implement and introduces new market 
risks to participants. 
 
Using other market based support may 
be appropriate in markets with an 
established certificate scheme. 
However, be cautious using it as 
substitute for auctions where 
exemptions are warranted. 
  
                                                     
4 Kitzing et al. (2016a): Comparison of auctions and alternative policy options for RES-E support. AURES report D6.2. link 
5 European Commission guidance for the design of renewables support schemes (2014): Guidelines on State aid for environmental 
protection and energy 2014-2020. link 
6 del Río et al. (2016a): Identification of alternative policy options to auctions for RES-E support. AURES report D6.1. link   
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4 Apples and oranges in the same basket? Technology 
neutral vs. specific auctions 
The question of whether to conduct technology neutral or technology specific auctions is a much debated 
topic. A main reason is that the EC State Aid Guidelines7 suggest a technology neutral approach, while most 
countries have a tradition for technology specific RES support. The main argument for combining several 
technologies in one auction is the better allocative efficiency when compared to separate, technology-specific 
auctions, as the lowest-cost projects across technologies are awarded. However, setting design elements 
such as ceiling prices, material and financial pre-qualifications, penalties and realisation deadlines is more 
challenging when several technologies are grouped together. 
There are many variations of multi-technology auctions. They range from truly technology neutral auctions, 
which combine all potential technologies into a single auction, to technology-basket auctions, which group 
together only two or three technologies with similar characteristics (for instance, technologies with similar 
generation costs).  
The idea behind a technology neutral auction is that all renewable energy technologies compete against each 
other on a level playing field in order to support those bidders which require the lowest support payment to 
supply the renewable electricity. Thus, in theory, in a technology neutral auction the bidders with the lowest 
generation costs are awarded and the outcome is considered efficient. However, this only holds for the static 
perspective. The assessment from a dynamic system perspective must consider additional aspects: 
Technology learning might reduce the costs of currently more expensive technologies in the future so that it 
becomes the most cost-efficient one. Hence, technology neutral auctions might not lead to the lowest 
generation costs when considering a longer time period. In addition, if technology neutrality leads to a 
reduction of investor diversity, this may decrease the level of competition and liquidity of auctions in the long 
run and hence increase costs. 
Furthermore, depending on policy goals, higher importance may be given to limiting support expenditures 
rather than minimising generation costs. If support expenditures are prioritised, then a technology specific 
auction will most probably be preferable, as support levels can specifically be differentiated between 
technologies. Also multi-technology auctions can achieve differentiation through implementation of 
discriminatory elements such as a quota or bonus or through different ceiling prices. If appropriately designed, 
such an auction uses the principle of third degree price discrimination to reduce the producer rent and thus 
the overall support costs. It is often referred to as to reducing windfall profits. However, such an auction 
design might lead to inefficient auction outcomes regarding the generation costs (Kreiss et al., 2017a8). 
 
 
                                                     
7 European Commission guidance for the design of renewables support schemes (2014): Guidelines on State aid for environmental 
protection and energy 2014-2020. link 
8 Kreiss et al. (2017a): Different cost perspectives for renewable energy support: Assessment of technology-neutral and discriminatory 
auctions. Forthcoming (submitted to scientific journal). 
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Finally, it is very difficult to design an auction that is actually neutral to all technologies. The different 
technologies have diverse characteristics (e.g. regarding planning procedures) and are therefore impacted 
differently by the same prequalification criteria and realisation periods. To avoid any favouritism, the auction 
design tends to be very complex. In summary, there is a trade-off between a technology neutral auction that in 
theory leads to an efficient outcome from a static perspective and the difficulties to design a real neutral 
auction as well as long term and cost advantages of technology specific and discriminatory multi technology 
auctions on the other hand. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 
TECHNOLOGY 
NEUTRAL 
All renewable technologies compete 
against each other to determine those 
projects with overall lowest generation 
costs, in the best case leading to 
efficiency and welfare maximum. 
A real neutral auction is very difficult to 
implement. Furthermore, it may not be 
efficient in a dynamic perspective and 
not lead to lowest cost deployment. 
MULTI-TECHNOLOGY 
WITH DISCRIMINATORY 
INSTRUMENTS 
Instruments, such as quota, maximum 
price and bonus, help to control the 
support for the different technologies and 
enable cost minimizing results for the 
auctioneer.   
Might reduce the allocative efficiency 
and also require some market 
knowledge to be implemented 
optimally. 
TECHNOLOGY 
SPECIFIC 
Gives full control over the support for the 
different technologies and high 
certainties for project developers. 
Might reduce the allocative efficiency 
and lead to high support prices through 
support of higher cost technologies. 
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5 How big should the party be? Single vs multiple item 
auctions 
Auctions for renewable energy support are usually multiple item auction where multiple item does generally 
not mean that a certain number of projects is awarded but a certain capacity (MW) or energy (MWh). This 
awarded amount is a divisible good and therefore more than one bidder can be awarded. Bidders compete 
with their projects, which they have pre-developed at sites selected by themselves. Winning projects are 
accepted until the target auction volume is full. For non-awarded bidders, the costs for pre-developing sites 
are sunk if they cannot compete in another auction round. Some auctions explicitly restrict the size of the 
winning projects to a level below the auctioned volume, whereas in other cases it would be theoretically 
possible that only one bidder is awarded, but this is unlikely. Multiple-item auctions are therefore suitable 
when the individual projects are smaller than the targeted auction volume and when there exists a solid 
pipeline with a steady flow of new projects – then several auction rounds can be undertaken each year. 
Single item auctions are the exception rather than the rule for renewable energy support. There are two 
reasons for implementing such an auction: 1) the auction volume is rather small, e.g. in small countries, and 
the project pipeline is not quite continuous (note: this is merely a special case of the multi-item auction); 2) the 
auctioneer selects a site for the future installation and pre-develops the site to a certain degree (this may 
include environmental evaluations, measurement of resource availability, evaluations on geological structure, 
etc.). Bidders then compete for the right to construct their renewable installations at this specific site. Due to 
the similar cost and revenue expectations for the competing bidders, there is a high risk for the awarded 
bidder to suffer the Winner’s curse9. Usually the grid infrastructure is then also developed and constructed in 
the same time frame as the renewable energy project. This is often the case for wind-offshore projects or 
large hydro projects (Haufe and Ehrhart, 201610).  
 
 OBSERVATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 
SINGLE ITEM 
Typically no regular auction schedule, 
therefore risk of unsteady award of projects 
and risk of the Winner’s curse.  
Should be implemented for very large 
projects that are pre-developed by the 
auctioneer, e.g. wind offshore projects. 
MULTIPLE ITEM 
The auction volume is awarded to the 
projects with the lowest costs. Sunk costs 
are incurred for pre-development for many 
more projects than awarded.  
Suitable when project sizes are smaller 
than the auction volume. There should 
always be enough projects in the 
pipeline. 
 
 
 
                                                     
9 Winner’s curse: Occurs when a winning bidder unintentionally underestimates their true costs and is awarded not because they actually 
have the lowest costs, but the most optimistic estimate of (uncertain) future costs. This may likely result in a loss for the project and 
increases risk of non-realisation. Theoretically, rational bidders include this risk in their bid and the winner’s curse does not occur. In 
practice however, it is evident. Auctioneers can mitigate the winner’s curse through pre-qualifications and penalties. 
10 Haufe and Ehrhart (2016): Assessment of Auction Types Suitable for RES-E. AURES report D3.1. link 
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6 Running fast and long: auction schedule and 
frequency 
The empirical analysis carried out in AURES with case studies has shown that continuity in the 
implementation of auction rounds, as opposed to a "stop-and-go" implementation, increases long-term 
planning certainty for market players (Wigand et al., 201611). Visibility of upcoming auction rounds with fixed 
dates enables the supply chain to plan for participation, and develop projects accordingly. This can add to 
high auction participation12. Our analysis shows that there are indeed numerous examples of the detrimental 
consequences of irregular or infrequent auctions, where losing in an auction means a long waiting time for 
project developers until further support options become available. This can lead to underbidding13, high 
investor risks and financing costs, low effectiveness14, low participation and issues with competition15. 
A long-term auction schedule is highly relevant in order to ensure a framework of certainty for investors. This 
certainly does not only avoid unnecessary investor risks but also unfavourable auction outcomes. If a single 
auction is undertaken without any envisaged repetition for the next years, this may push bidders to bid (too) 
aggressively and potentially underbid. When there are no obvious possibilities for obtaining support at a later 
point in time, developers may this way try to limit their losses especially when they already are in late project 
realisation phases. Auctions may then seem successful as they result in low support levels. However, this 
may eventually lead to low realisation rates if bidders cannot cover their costs with the awarded support level.  
In addition, a schedule facilitates the development of a robust supply chain because equipment manufacturers 
can plan their investments accordingly (del Río and Linares, 201416), with auctions providing a steady stream 
of newly contracted projects17. In order to increase flexibility for the auctioning authority while accommodating 
the need for investor certainty, a two-step approach can be beneficial. The first step is an auction roadmap 
with a time horizon of up to 10 years (but for at least 3-5 years). The second step is a more detailed auction 
schedule with specific description of the upcoming auctions to be published at least every 2 years for the next 
2 years (see Kitzing et al., 2016b18 for further details).  
A main lesson from AURES is that auction frequency is context- and technology-dependent. It is always a 
challenge to balance increased risks for investors in case of a low frequency with higher transaction costs and 
fluctuations in the competition level in case of a high frequency (Kitzing et al., 2016b18). The optimal number 
                                                     
11 Wigand et al. (2016): Auctions for renewable energy support: lessons learnt from international experiences. AURES report D4.2. link 
12 See e.g. for California in Fitch-Roy (2015): Auctions for Renewable Support in California: Instruments and lessons learnt. AURES 
report D4.1-CAL. link and Wigand et al. (2016): Auctions for renewable energy support: lessons learnt from international experiences. 
AURES report D4.2. link 
13 See e.g. for Poland in Kitzing and Wendring (2016): Implementation of Auctions for Renewable Energy Support in Poland:  A case 
study. AURES report D7.1-PL. link and for the UK in Fitch-Roy and Woodman (2016): Auctions for Renewable Energy Support in the 
United Kingdom: Instruments and lessons learnt. AURES report D4.1-UK. link  
14 See e.g. for Ireland in Steinhilber (2016): Auctions for Renewable Energy Support in Ireland: Instruments and Lessons Learnt. AURES 
report D4.1-IE. link  
15 See e.g. for Denmark in Kitzing and Wendring (2015): Implementing Auctions for Renewable Support in Denmark: Instruments and 
lessons learnt. AURES report D4.1-DK. link; and for the UK in Butler and Neuhoff (2008): Comparison of Feed-in Tariff, Quota and 
Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development. Renewable Energy 33, 1854-1867. 
16 del Río and Linares. (2014): Back to the future? Rethinking auctions for renewable electricity support. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 35, 42-56. 
17 See e.g. the positive effects on the wind industry in Brazil in Elizondo et al (2014): Promoting Renewable Energy through Auctions: The 
Case of Brazil. The World Bank. 
18 Kitzing et al. (2016b): Recommendations on the role of auctions in a new renewable energy directive. AURES report. link 
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of auction rounds per period is likely to depend on the technology and situation of the market, with fewer 
rounds for technologies with potentially fewer actors (such as offshore wind) and more frequent rounds in the 
case of technologies (or technology groups) with more potential participants (such as roof-top solar PV) (del 
Río et al., 2015b19).  
If markets are large enough, it can be beneficial to undertake auctions several times a year, e.g. once every 
quarter, but it is also common that in small markets or for single projects, auctions are undertaken once a year 
or even less often (Kitzing et al., 2016b18). A frequency of more than one round per year can reduce project 
development risks (such as the risk of expiring permits), but may also increase transaction costs. As a 
safeguard, regulators (or any other auctioneering authority) should be allowed to adjust auction schedules 
according to perceived shifts in market conditions (Wigand et al., 201620). 
 
 OBSERVATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 
SCHEDULE FOR 
AUCTIONS 
A long-term auction schedule avoids 
unnecessary investor risks, unfavourable 
auction outcomes (too aggressive bidding) 
and facilitates the development of a robust 
supply chain. 
Long term, forward-looking auction 
roadmaps should be adopted (at least 3-5 
years ahead), as well as detailed auction 
schedules (2 years ahead).  
FREQUENCY OF 
AUCTIONS 
Auction frequency is context- and 
technology-dependent. 
The optimal number of rounds is between 
4 times a year and once every few years, 
depending on technology, auction volumes 
and market situation. 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
19 del Río et al. (2015b): Assessment criteria for RES-E Auctions. AURES report D2.2 (b). link 
20 Wigand et al. (2016): Auctions for renewable energy support: lessons learnt from international experiences. AURES report D4.2. link 
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7 Beauty contest: auction volumes and limits  
The auction volume can be defined in terms of capacity (MW), generation (MWh), or budget (€). All of these 
options have benefits and drawbacks, as explained below21. In previous RES auctions, capacity caps have 
been the most common, while budget caps have been introduced in three of the countries analysed in AURES 
(Wigand et al., 201622). 
 
Auction volume determined in terms of capacity (MW) 
When the target volume of an auction is expressed in terms of installed capacity, the auctioned good is in 
most cases also defined in terms of capacity. A bidder thus commits to installing the offered capacity within 
the specified realisation deadline. Since the support payments are often based on RES generation (in 
€/MWh), a capacity target volume provides less ex-ante security on total policy costs compared to a budget-
based auction target. By setting an appropriate ceiling price, it is possible to contain this risk. Auctions with 
capacity target volumes provide a good planning environment for the electricity sector and enable easy 
monitoring regarding the achievement of RES policy goals (which are often stated in terms of capacity or 
production shares). In contrast, under budget caps the amount of RES received will depend purely on the 
emerging price of the auction. When capacity volumes are auctioned, realisation of the auctioned volume can 
be measured as soon as capacity is installed, whereas budget and generation volumes rely on project 
operation to realise the contracted volumes.  
From the perspective of a winning bidder, committing to realise a certain capacity (rather than production 
volume), comes with fewer uncertainties. Capacity-based volumes also give the strongest signal to equipment 
manufacturers and developers about the relevant market size for the future, and may therefore lead to further 
cost reductions from innovation and supply chain improvements (Kitzing et al., 2016b23)24.  
 
Auction volume determined in terms of generation (MWh) 
Generation-based targets are unusual. Two options are possible: 1) the auction volume is set in terms of 
actual generation over the course of a given time frame (or an actual annual average); or 2) annual generation 
is estimated by combining standardised technology-specific annual full-load-hours with installed capacities. 
From the viewpoint of a policy maker, a generation target volume provides less ex-ante security on total policy 
costs, compared to a budget-based auction target. However, by setting an appropriate ceiling price, it is 
possible to contain this risk. Auctions with generation-based target volumes provide a good planning 
environment for the whole electricity sector and enable easy monitoring regarding the achievement of RES 
policy targets, especially if these are formulated in terms of share of total electricity generation. For bidders, 
committing to the delivery of a certain generation volume is more risky than a certain capacity, exposing them 
e.g. to variations in weather conditions. This can be mitigated by defining a range (minimum and maximum) of 
                                                     
21 See also auresproject.eu/auction-volume for further details. 
22 Wigand et al. (2016): Auctions for renewable energy support: lessons learnt from international experiences. AURES report D4.2. link 
23 Kitzing et al. (2016b): Recommendations on the role of auctions in a new renewable energy directive. AURES report. link 
24 The market signal for equipment manufacturers would be uncertain in generation-based targets and absent in budget-based targets. 
See also del Río et al (2016b): Policy Memo 3: The effect of award types on auction outcomes. AURES report. link 
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annual production delivery, increasing the period in which contracted volumes are to be delivered, or by 
including some corrections in relation to ‘normal’ production years. 
 
Auction volume determined in terms of budget (€) 
When the target volume of an auction is set in terms of a maximum budget, winners are allocated support 
concessions until the full budget is used. The auctioned good is still usually either expressed in terms of 
generation (MWh) or capacity (MW). For generation-based remuneration schemes, it is typically the 
auctioneer who, in order to select winners until the budget limit is reached, estimates the total support 
expenditures per project, either based on own estimations of production or on information given by the 
bidders. A budget target volume sets a clear upper limit for support expenditures, thus providing security 
regarding policy costs for the regulator, and ultimately, electricity consumers. However, with a budget cap it is 
ex-ante unclear how much capacity will be installed as a result of each auction round. This makes planning in 
the electricity system more difficult. It also means that the achievement of policy targets (which are usually 
expressed in terms of installed capacities or shares of total electricity production) is more difficult to monitor. 
This can lead to both under- or overachievement of policy targets. Budget caps are thus less straightforward 
to be deduced from existing policy targets and must be constantly monitored and readjusted according to 
technology cost developments. 
 
Disclosure of auction volumes 
Auction volumes can be disclosed or kept hidden from the bidders during the auction. Undisclosed volumes 
can mitigate cases of uncertain competitive situations, by reducing the likelihood of strategic bidding. This 
could prevent auctions from ending prematurely and avoid artificially high support levels. Some countries 
decided not to disclose volumes to discourage strategic behaviour and collusion25. On the other hand, a 
disclosed, reliable auction volume can also create competition by sending a strong signal to investors to 
develop the required project pipeline (Wigand et al., 201626).  
  
                                                     
25 See e.g. in Brazil (Förster and Amato (2016): Auctions for Renewable Energy Support in Brazil: Instruments and lessons learnt. 
AURES report D4.1-BRA. link) and in South Africa (del Río (2016): Auctions for Renewable Energy Support in South Africa: Instruments 
and lessons learnt. AURES report D4.1-ZA. link) 
26 Wigand et al. (2016): Auctions for renewable energy support: lessons learnt from international experiences. AURES report D4.2. link 
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 OBSERVATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 
CAPACITY CAP 
Easy and quick assessment of the 
achievement of RES policy targets  
Less ex-ante security on total policy 
costs than budget-based caps 
Strongest signal to equipment 
manufacturers and developers about 
the relevant market size for the future 
Fewer uncertainties for awarded 
bidders regarding compliance 
Apply capacity caps to achieve a good 
balance across policy trade-offs: control 
of policy costs, monitoring of 
effectiveness (realisation rates) and risks 
for bidders. 
 
ENERGY CAP 
Less ex-ante security on total policy 
costs than budget-based caps 
Committing to the delivery of a certain 
annual generation volume is more risky 
for bidders than committing to the 
installation of a certain capacity. 
Similar to capacity caps, but lower 
score regarding monitoring of 
effectiveness and risks for bidders 
Apply energy caps for an easy and quick 
assessment of the achievement of RES 
policy targets. 
 
BUDGET CAP 
More ex-ante security on total policy 
costs 
More challenging to monitor the 
achievement of policy targets in terms 
of installed capacities or shares of total 
electricity production 
Apply budget-based caps when the 
control support costs is virtually the only 
policy goal. 
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8 What to do, how to do it: process and procedures for 
auctions 
The process of designing RES auctions requires capacity and resources that should not be underestimated. 
The starting point of auction design is the individual policy goals on one hand and the current market situation 
on the other. The optimal choices regarding design options (including type, pricing mechanism, and more) 
heavily depend on these two fundamental factors. No 
single perfect auction design exists, as auctions need to 
be tailored to the specific situation. Otherwise, 
competiveness and efficient outcomes might be 
endangered. 27 
The auction design process should therefore start with 
extensive market research, especially regarding the 
project pipeline of the targeted technologies, the potential 
market participants, likely bidders and their comparative 
competitive positions. On this basis, design choices can 
be made (as described elsewhere in this report). To 
ensure high participation and optimise the auction design, 
we recommend to test the draft auction design with 
stakeholders, especially also regarding the impact on 
different actor groups (if e.g. actor diversity is an issue). 
Preferential treatment options could be implemented to adjust for unwanted effects on certain actor groups. 
Finally, short and long term consequences of the auction should be analysed and monitored throughout the 
implementation period and auction design continuously updated based on these results, as well as based on 
changed policy goals and market environments.  
Since all auction designs have to be specifically tailored to individual market situations, the found solutions are 
often unique, implying that often unexpected and unwanted effects will occur, e.g. related to strategic bidding 
or creative rule interpretation by market participants. Therefore, it is very important to monitor results and 
continuously adjust designs in preceding auction rounds. 
Certain general design options regarding process can help to ensure successful auctions. These include 
publishing a long-term auction roadmap, and a more detailed auction plan for shorter time horizons, as 
mentioned above. In any case, project realisation time granted to winners should be reasonable, considering 
typical project development cycles and required project progress (“early” or “late” auction). 
 
  
                                                     
27 Wigand and Tiedemann (2016): Specific design elements for RES auctions: ensuring actor diversity. AURES Auction Academy webinar 
#7. link 
Figure 2: Process for the design of an auction, 
Source: Wigand and Tiedemann (201627) 
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Early or late auctions? 
Auctions can take place at different stages of the project development process. They could e.g. be conducted 
rather early in the project planning process (as illustrated in Tiedemann and Haufe, 201628). Alternatively, 
projects can be required to wait until e.g. after the permitting procedure to participate in an auction. This has 
implications on the cost, the risk level, and also on the actor composition, as illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
Generally, one could expect to have a larger number of bidders in early auctions, most of which are project 
developers. If auctions are conducted later in the project development process (i.e. through prequalification 
requirements), typically fewer projects would qualify and they have incurred greater costs before the auction. 
In late auctions, lower penalty levels can be set, since prequalification requirements already incentivise 
bidders to be more ‘serious’.  
 
 
29 
Sunk cost problem in auctions 
The later the auctions are placed in the process, the higher the sunk costs that project developers incur ahead 
of the auction. Since sunk cost play no role in economic considerations after they have occurred, they do not 
enter strictly economically rationale bids. If bidders behave this way, it is likely that winning projects will incur a 
loss over the lifetime, which in the long term reduces the acceptance of the support scheme. In addition, 
investors may be driven out of the market and participation might decrease, leading to a decline in 
competition.  
  
                                                     
28 Tiedemann and Haufe (2016): How to participate in an auction for RES support. AURES Auction Academy webinar #5. link 
29 Wigand and Tiedemann (2016): Specific design elements for RES auctions: ensuring actor diversity. AURES Auction Academy webinar 
#7. link  
Figure 3: Changing actor composition for auctions conducted at different stages (Wigand and Tiedemann, 201629) 
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 OBSERVATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 
AUCTION DESIGN 
CHOICES  
No single perfect auction design exits. Auction design needs to consider policy 
goals and the current market situation. 
Auction design should be monitored to 
implement adjustments for updated 
policy goals and market environments. 
EARLY OR LATE 
AUCTION 
Auction can take place at different 
stages of the project. 
A balance between pre-qualification 
requirements and penalties should be 
created: 
Early auctions: lower prequalification 
requirements balanced by penalties 
Late auctions: lower penalties balanced 
by pre-qualification requirements   
 
 
 
9 The more the merrier: participation enhancing 
measures 
Attracting the largest possible number of participants is an important success factor for auctions. All auction 
design processes should consider participation enhancing measures. Barriers to participation should be 
avoided (such as publishing of tender material in local language only etc.). In the AURES case studies, we 
have found that participation can be facilitated by a transparent and inclusive design and implementation 
process, together with the incorporation of feedback from developers into the final auction specifications 
(Wigand et al., 201630). We suggest auction design processes to incorporate: 1) A process for stakeholder 
consultation: conduct at least one stakeholder dialogue meeting before tender material is published; 2) 
Sufficient consultation time: Give at least 15-30 days for commenting on draft specifications; 3) Sufficient bid 
preparation time: Allow at least 60-90 days between official final call (with published final tender 
specifications) and bid submission deadline. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 
BIDDERS 
PARTICIPATION 
Attracting participants is an important 
success factor for auctions. 
Incorporate stakeholder consultations 
Give sufficient consultation and bid 
preparation time 
                                                     
30 Wigand et al. (2016): Auctions for renewable energy support: lessons learnt from international experiences. AURES report D4.2. link 
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10 Beacon in the dark: ceiling prices in auctions 
A ceiling price is a maximum price in an auction, where bids above the ceiling price will be disqualified. There 
are several arguments for and against ceiling prices in RES auctions. On the downside, ceiling prices could 
limit competition and work as a focus point of bids. This can distort the price signal of the auction when 
bidders orient their bids towards the ceiling prices rather than their true costs. Overly aggressive ceiling prices 
can also be distorting as they may make an auction unattractive for investors, potentially resulting in situations 
where not all auctioned volume is awarded (no "market-clearing"). On the upside, especially in multi-
technology auctions and uncertain competitive situations, ceiling prices can help to differentiate between 
bidder groups and orient stronger bidders towards the ceiling price instead of weaker bids, which is beneficial 
for competition. If less bids are offered than there is auction volume, ceiling prices can ‘save’ the auction by 
providing an objective award price. They also put a cap on total support costs and thus increase budget 
certainty for years in advance.  
In general, if there is sufficient competition in the auction (a pre-condition for successful auctions), the 
potential distortion introduced by a ceiling price should be compensated because bidders still have the 
incentive to place competitive bids. In that sense, ceiling prices can do more good than harm. 
Disclosing the ceiling price to bidders in advance has the advantage that it prevents otherwise qualifying 
projects from being rejected simply because bidders did not know the ceiling price. The disclosure of the 
ceiling price also gives bidders more planning security, increasing the acceptance of the auction. A 
disadvantage of disclosing ceiling prices in a static auction (e.g. sealed-bid auction) is that it can weaken the 
competitive price discovery of the auction if bidders orient their bids toward the ceiling price (see above).  
Usually ceiling prices are set based on an assessment of generation costs (LCOE) and thus technology 
specific. The LCOE-based ceiling price should be calculated from the perspective of a typical investor, taking 
regulatory framework and transaction costs into account (taxes and tax exemptions, market risk premiums, 
financing conditions, etc.). Since auctions increase risks for investors (as compared to administratively set 
support), the LCOE calculation should also account for this risk. Ceiling prices need to be regularly adapted to 
evolving technology costs and market realities. This could be done by (manual) recalculation by the 
administrative authority, by indexing to economic indicators (such as raw material prices, interest rates, etc.), 
or they could be adjusted based on the auction outcomes of previous rounds. The first option involves regular 
transaction costs but is well established in many countries with feed-in tariffs, the second option requires 
higher transaction cost to set up the methodology, and the third option requires some attention to the risk of 
underbidding (Kitzing et al., 2016b31).  
                                                     
31 Kitzing et al. (2016b): Recommendations on the role of auctions in a new renewable energy directive. AURES report. link  
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 OBSERVATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 
SETTING A 
CEILING PRICE 
Ceiling prices put a cap on total support 
costs, so policy makers have more certainty 
about policy expenditures.  
If competition is low, a ceiling price can 
incentivise bidders to place bids close to the 
ceiling price rather than to their true costs.  
If the ceiling price is set too low, the auction 
may become unattractive for investors, 
decreasing competition. 
Under sufficient competition, the 
distortional effect of a ceiling price is not 
determinant, while it increases certainty 
about policy costs. We therefore suggest 
the use of ceiling prices.  
Ceiling prices should be calculated using 
an LCOE-based approach and be 
adjusted regularly. 
DISCLOSING A 
CEILING PRICE 
Prevents otherwise qualifying projects from 
being rejected in the auction. 
Gives bidders more planning security, 
particularly in the face of sunk costs of 
participating in the auction. 
Weakens the competitive price discovery of 
the auction if bidders orient their bids toward 
the ceiling price. 
Ceiling prices should be disclosed to 
bidders in advance of the auction, as 
otherwise qualifying projects could be 
rejected in the auction, and additional 
uncertainty for developers would be 
created.  
 
 
 
11 Realisation safeguards: prequalification 
requirements and penalties  
The primary aim of prequalification criteria and penalties as design elements in the auctions is to secure a 
high project realisation rate and reduce delay. However, policy makers may also use prequalification 
requirements in relation to secondary objectives (see Section 12). Setting adequate pre-qualification criteria 
and penalties is one of the most important and challenging tasks of designing an auction, because they highly 
affect the risk level of the participating bidders and thus the bid prices and competition level (Kreiss et al., 
2017b32). 
We generally distinguish three types of prequalification requirements: 1) Restrictions, which limit the 
participation in the auction and only allow bidders or projects with certain qualities, e.g. experience level or 
technology type; 2) Material prequalification, which requires a certain project development stage upon 
entering the auction, e.g. obtained planning permits or grid concession; and 3) Financial pre-qualification, 
which are financial guarantees to secure the completion of the project and usually connected to the penalties, 
                                                     
32 Kreiss et al. (2017b): Appropriate design of auctions for renewable energy support – Prequalifications and penalties. AURES 
deliverable D3.2, published in Energy Policy 101, 512-520. 
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e.g. bid bonds. The three types affect auction outcomes differently as briefly discussed in the table below (see 
Rosenlund Soysal, 201633 for more detail). 
Auction participation and bidding behaviour can be affected by pre-qualification requirements. Here, it is not 
only a question of how strict the requirements are, but also of which practical barriers exist related to pre-
qualification. For instance, obtaining permits may pose a significant administrative burden on the project 
developers and increase the cost of project development. Policy makers can limit the amount of double or 
triple work related to e.g. obtaining permits by adapting auction rules to the existing permit system. 
Additionally, auctions should be conducted frequently enough to prevent obtained permits from expiring 
before bidders get ‘another shot’. This way, bidders can re-enter auctions without significant additional costs. 
Another example is the amount of time given to auction participants to negotiate bid bonds with financial 
institutions. Allowing more time gives bidders the opportunity to get better deals. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 
RESTRICTIONS 
Restrictions provide control over the 
groups of bidders participating in an 
auction (e.g. technology, size, experience 
etc.). 
They reduce allocative efficiency by 
preventing certain bidders from 
participating. Support cost will potentially 
increase. 
Can be implemented with care if 
experience is highly important or 
realisation of projects essential. Also, if 
auctions shall have a narrow technology 
focus. 
MATERIAL PRE-
QUALIFICATION 
Ensures high project realisation and 
reduces risk of Winner’s curse, because it 
forces bidders to know their project and its 
costs well. 
Increases sunk cost for the project 
developers, and causes additional risk. 
Material pre-qualifications such as 
requiring a certain project development 
stage (having obtained crucial permits) 
have proven to be an important 
safeguard for project realisation. 
 
FINANCIAL PRE-
QUALIFICATION 
AND PENALTIES 
Reduces incentives for underbidding, thus 
helps to secure seriousness of bids.  
Reduces delay and increases project 
realisation. Financial pre-qualification can 
guarantee the payments of penalties 
(through the use of bid bonds to be placed 
at bidding). 
Penalties increase the risk of the bidders, 
potentially leading to higher bid prices. If 
penalties are too large and financial 
guarantees too difficult to obtain, they may 
deter project developers from participating. 
Penalties and connected financial pre-
qualification requirements (through bid 
bonds) have proven to be an important 
safeguard for project realisation. 
Pay special attention to the design of 
pre-qualification and penalties; adapt 
these to technology, market conditions, 
and existing regulatory regime. 
  
                                                     
33 Rosenlund Soysal (2016). Policy Memo 2: Pre-qualification and Penalties. AURES Report. link 
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12 What if least cost is not the only policy goal: 
secondary objectives in auctions 
Next to achieving an economically efficient allocation of support funds, a policy maker may have other policy 
objectives. The most common secondary objectives are actor diversity (usually, this means improving the 
chances of small actors), a certain geographic distribution, domestic industry development, system 
integration, or certain technical specifications. Different measures exist to take into account each of these 
objectives. Of course, desirable projects can also be favoured outside of the auction, for example by providing 
them with extra counselling during participation, or by exempting them from auctions altogether. In the table 
below, measures to implement secondary objectives within an auction are listed, based on findings and 
information from Steinhilber and Rosenlund Soysal (2016)34 as well as the AURES Auction Designer35.  
By definition, measures to internalise secondary objectives into an auction are applied to favour projects that 
otherwise would have lower chances of winning, usually because they have structurally higher generation 
costs. In such case, the policy maker faces a trade-off with the objective of economic efficiency (i.e. awarding 
those projects with the lowest costs). In many cases, compromising on economic efficiency will also translate 
into higher support expenditures. However, there may be cases in which separating the favoured higher-cost 
from lower-cost bidders (i.e. by creating contingents) may actually increase competitive pressure among 
lower-cost bidders, thus leading to overall lower support costs (Kreiss et al., 2017a36).   
 
 OBSERVATIONS POSSIBLE MEASURES 
ACTOR DIVERSITY 
Defining “small” actors is challenging.  
Favourable treatment creates an 
incentive for all actors to try being 
included in the exemption.  
Reduced financial or material 
prequalification / penalty for small actors 
Different pricing rule for small actors 
Contingents (quotas) for small actors 
GEOGRAPHIC 
DISTRIBUTION 
This is only relevant for multiple-item 
auctions, as single-item auctions usually 
have a pre-determined and pre-
developed location. 
Contingents (quotas) for certain locations 
Prequalification criterion for certain 
locations 
Criterion in auction to favour certain 
locations 
Reference yield model 
                                                     
34 Steinhilber and Rosenlund Soysal (2016). Policy Memo 1: Secondary Objectives in Auctions. AURES report. link 
35 auresproject.eu/auctiondesigner  
36 Kreiss et al. (2017a): Different cost perspectives for renewable energy support: Assessment of technology-neutral and discriminatory 
auctions. Forthcoming (submitted to scientific journal). 
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DOMESTIC INDUSTRY 
DEVELOPMENT 
Local content rules in auctions are in 
many cases legally problematic. 
  
Prequalification requirement regarding 
job and cluster creation 
Criterion in auction to favour job and 
cluster creation 
Consider to include options outside the 
auction such as creation of innovation 
clusters and through training 
programmes. This may result in a more 
cost-efficient measure. 
SYSTEM 
INTEGRATION 
Under current state aid regulation, 
generation-based support is required to 
be paid in the form of a feed-in premium 
in EU Member States, exposing RES 
projects to electricity prices to differing 
degrees, depending on the design.  
Select a remuneration award metric that 
exposes RES to electricity prices. 
Deep connection cost charging 
TECHNICAL 
SPECIFICATIONS 
Conceptually, favouring certain technical 
specifications in an auction is no different 
from differentiating between RES 
technologies (such as onshore wind, 
hydro, PV, etc.). Similar arguments 
apply.  
Conduct separate auctions for separate 
technology groups. 
Contingents (Quotas) 
Criterion in auction for desired technical 
specification 
Boni for desired technical specification 
 
 
 
13 Can bigger be better? Cross-border auctions 
Awarding support for renewable energy has so far mainly been a national matter, related to national 
deployment targets and national fiscal policies. However, cross-border auctions that allow projects located in 
one country to participate in support auctions of another country, are a trend arising from European market 
integration and are in fact requested by the European Commission37. The economic rationale behind cross-
border auctions is that they could lead to more efficient RES deployment and induce support cost savings. 
Cost savings can be achieved when a specified output of electricity can be generated at lower costs by two or 
more countries than it could by each country providing the output individually, e.g. when additional low-cost 
sites become accessible. In addition, economies of scale and of scope can be achieved if two or more 
countries jointly organise an auction. Another benefit might be the increased competition and reduction of 
implicit collusion, which can also lead to efficiency gains. 
                                                     
37 European Commission (2017), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use of 
energy from renewable sources (recast). link 
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Despite potential efficiency gains, most countries are still reluctant to implement cross-border auctions due to 
low public acceptance of paying support to RES projects located in other countries (Klessmann et al., 201438). 
The process of reaching a cross-border agreement is complex because the design and implementation 
process includes negotiations between at least two countries, agreements between different regulatory 
agencies, two sets of market conditions and two governments with each their political considerations. 
However, once the parties reach agreement on a cross-border support scheme, they may be less likely to re-
open negotiations for adjustments, which may results in increased stability for market players. 
There are several types of cross-border auctions: 1) national auctions may be unilaterally opened, 2) national 
auctions may be mutually opened, or 3) joint auctions can be conducted. These options come with different 
involvement by the participating countries and with increased complexity. 
For a well-functioning auction, it is necessary to create a level playing field, i.e. for all bidders to participate on 
equal basis. This can be challenging when bidders participate under different physical and fiscal regulations. 
In addition, different design choices can either increase or decrease complexity. For example, sliding 
premiums require selecting a reference market for determining the support to be paid out, which has 
implications on both the risk allocation, the attractiveness of the auction and the monitoring. A fixed premium 
will be easier to handle, as no market price calculations are necessary, see Gephart and Kitzing (2016)39 for a 
more detailed discussion. The auctioneer of a cross-border auction may face additional administrative 
challenges. For instance, it may be difficult to assess the pre-qualification documentation and monitoring the 
project implementation in another country. It is crucial to agree on cross-border mechanisms ensuring close 
cooperation between administrations. 
 
 
 OBSERVATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 
CROSS-BORDER 
AUCTIONS 
Potential for improved efficiency through 
regional integration 
Commitment of policy makers to negotiate 
a cross-border agreement promotes 
stability and predictability for the market 
players. 
To place a reasonable bid, the auction 
participants need to know not only their 
own market but also the market of the 
other countries. 
It is crucial to create a level playing field for 
all bidders and implement cross-border 
mechanisms between administrations to 
control bidder’s pre-conditions and project 
implementation. 
 
  
                                                     
38 Klessmann et al. (2014): Cooperation between EU MS under the RES Directive. link 
39 Gephart and Kitzing (2016): Implementation of Auctions for Renewable Energy Support in in the Netherlands and Denmark: a 
Cooperation Case Study. AURES report D7.1-NL/DK. link 
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14 Auction myths 
 
Myth #1: Auctions are the best solution 
The AURES project has shown that auctions can be a suitable instrument for allocating support under budget 
and volume limitations and that they can achieve significant short-term efficiency gains. We expect that 
adequate auction design tailored to national market conditions and policy goals synchronised with project 
development made by the industry will further reduce the cost of renewable energy and facilitate increasing 
their share in the energy system.  
Auctions ensure through competition that renewable energy is delivered cheaper to final consumers and 
taxpayers and at the same time give the industry an incentive to improve their performance and deliver 
competitive solutions. However, it has not been proven that auctions in general are better suited to support 
renewables than other instruments. Certain market conditions are necessary for competitive price 
determination to be preferable to administrative price setting (e.g. through feed-in schemes). For example, 
sufficient resource and market potential must be available. Supply must always exceed demand (i.e. the 
political target for renewable build-out), so that competition in each auction can be achieved. Additionally, a 
sufficient amount of bidders must be attracted to participate in the auction and they must have similar cost 
structures so that true competition can evolve. If these basic conditions for competition are not fulfilled, then 
administratively set prices can be preferable.  
Auctions require certain institutional capacity. It has to be ensured that policy makers designing the auction 
and auctioneers undertaking the auctions have enough resources to deal with the new challenges that 
auctions imply, such as ensuring sufficient competition for a well-functioning price formation, avoiding 
undesired strategic incentives, collusion and other market distortions, and importantly dealing with risk of low 
realisation rates.  
 
Myth #2: Auctions are the worst option 
Renewable energy auctions have had a difficult history. Some early experiences showed either very low 
project realisation rates or lack of competition (bidders), which resulted in high costs. More recently, however, 
improved understanding of the pitfalls of auction design and consequently careful auction designs using 
appropriate safeguards means that many auctions have delivered on their policy goals of renewable energy 
deployment at costs that appear favourable. Auctions are not a one-size-fits all solution; there are situations in 
which they are not appropriate. However, in the right situation and with the right goals in mind, auctions can 
be a useful part of the renewable energy policy toolbox. 
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Myth #3: Auctions lead to higher market concentration and penalise small bidders  
Auctions can indeed lead to higher market concentration and penalise small bidders. Usually, auctions are 
cost-based, i.e. those bidders who can offer the lowest bids are awarded. Low costs can be offered especially 
by large and established companies, making use of economies of scale or a vertically integrated value chain. 
In the long run, when these bidders are frequently successful, smaller entities may be pushed out of the 
market. However, analysis in the AURES project has shown that auctions can be designed to safeguard actor 
diversity (e.g. applying additional criteria benefitting smaller bidders or exemption rules allowing them to 
receive non-auction based support). In fact, auctions can be efficient while not changing the market structure 
to the advantage of large-scale bidders.  
 
Myth #4: Bidders behave rationally 
In economic theory, market participants are usually described as to behaving rationally (homo economicus). 
However, recent field studies and experiments suggest that this is not always the case and that there are 
even structural flaws to this assumption (Haufe et al., 201740). Thus, also auctions for renewable energy 
support can be exposed to unreasonable bidding and the auctioneer should seek for a design that minimises 
the risk ensuing from this behaviour and bidders should account for this possibility when deciding on their 
bidding strategy. 
 
Myth #5: Auctions resulting in zero support will lead to zero revenue for investors 
Record-low bids in recent auctions for offshore wind in Europe have made the news. In April 2017 in 
Germany, projects to be commissioned by 2024/25 were awarded with zero support41. In September 2017 in 
the UK, projects to be built by 2021/22 were awarded with unprecedented low support levels42. So why did we 
see zero bids in Germany and not in the UK? There are several factors explaining the auction price difference 
in these countries. One of them is the structure of the feed-in premium (FIP) awarded in each country. In the 
UK, auction winners sign a Contract for Difference (CfD) defining the type of FIP they are paid for generating 
electricity. If electricity prices are lower than the auction price (i.e. strike price), the operator receives the 
difference (a premium). If the electricity price exceeds the strike price, operators pay back the difference to the 
government. In Germany, on the other hand, a sliding FIP is paid where operators can keep the upside if the 
market price increases above the bid price. A zero-bid in Germany is therefore is not the same as a zero-bid 
in the United Kingdom. While a zero-bid in the United Kingdom would be equivalent to zero revenue, a zero-
bid in Germany means that a project will be built with zero support but still with revenue from the sale of 
electricity at the wholesale market. 
  
                                                     
40 Haufe et al. (2017) : The Winner’s Curse in Discriminatory and Uniform Price Auctions under Varying Competition Levels. AURES 
report D3.4. link 
41 Bids by Ørsted (previously DONG Energy) and EnBW.  
42 €92.18/MWh (£74.75/MWh) and €70.91/MWh (£57.50/MWh), in 2012 prices (as the budget envelope (known as the Levy Control 
Framework) was conceived and implemented in 2012, with all future expenditure limits expressed in 2012 prices). Payments to operators 
will be adjusted for inflation. The 2012 exchange rate of 1 Euro = 0.811 Pound from the German Federal Bank was used. 
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Myth #6: Selecting pay-as-bid versus uniform pricing rule greatly influences the auction outcome 
Policy makers often discuss at great length which pricing rule to choose for their auction. However, be aware 
that while this choice can of course affect the auction outcome, this effect is not nearly as strong as that of 
other factors, such as the level of competition, or whether ceiling prices, pre-qualifications, and penalties are 
designed well. Experiences with PV pilot auctions in Germany have shown that alternating between the 
pricing rule throughout several rounds seems to have no significant influence on the resulting price. 
Furthermore, making small changes to auction design, such as alternating pricing rules, can help avoid 
implicit collusion as bidders have less chance to get too used to one auction mechanism. Therefore, it could 
be beneficial to test both pay-as-bid as well as uniform pricing (with lowest rejected bid) in consecutive auction 
rounds. 
 
Myth #7: The uniform pricing rule leads to better bids (is incentive compatible)  
In the context of auctions for renewable energy support and the assessment of the two pricing rules pay-as-
bid and uniform pricing, the latter one is regularly referred to as the favourable option as it is theoretically 
incentive compatible. An auction rule is incentive compatible if it is the optimal strategy for each bidder to bid 
according to their true costs. Indisputably, this is a much-desired characteristic for both the auctioneer (as 
they can learn most from the bids) and bidders (as they can easily calculate their bids). However, this 
characteristic only holds under particular (theoretic) assumptions that almost never materialise in realistic 
auction implementations. As soon as bidders participate with more than one bid or in more than one auction 
round or their costs have some common components (e.g. PV-module prices), uniform pricing is not incentive 
compatible anymore, and can thus not be expected to automatically lead to superior results as compared to 
pay-as-bid. 
 
Myth #8: Technology neutral auctions achieve lower support costs 
When only static cost-efficiency is taken into consideration, technology neutral auctions can indeed lead to 
superior outcomes, since technologies with the lowest generation costs are utilised first. Technology neutral 
auctions are also often proposed by governments based on the belief that they would lead to lower support 
costs compared to technology specific auctions. However, the opposite is the case: if the aim is not to reduce 
generation costs, but to reduce support expenditures, then a technology-specific auction would often be more 
suitable. The reason is that in such auctions support levels can be differentiated per technology, thus reducing 
profits for the cheapest technologies. The support levels would be more adapted to the costs of the different 
technologies, in accordance with the principle of third degree price discrimination (see Section 4 of this 
report).  
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15 Good practices in auction design 
The AURES project has shown that auctions can only successfully contribute to achieving effective and 
efficient RES deployment if they are specifically designed to match the market environment in the area 
where the auction is conducted, taking into account specific policy goals, the supply-demand situation of 
RES projects, project pipelines in comparison to deployment targets, potential bidder structure, 
competitive positioning of bidders, risk of collusion, experience of bidders and/or auctioneer with 
previous auctions, level and quality of market and cost information, and more. The optimal auction design 
for a single implementation therefore may be very different from the optimal auction design for a different 
market or even time period. Nonetheless, we have identified several good practices that can with benefit be 
taken into consideration when designing auctions for renewable support: 
 
#1 Always adapt auctions to the specific situation 
 Auction design needs to match the current market environment and policy goals 
 Auction design needs to be flexible and be updated often to accommodate changes in market situation 
and policy goals and to correct for previous unwanted incentives 
 
#2 Secure sufficient competition 
 Attract as many serious, true-cost bids as possible, by carefully choosing appropriate auction designs  
 Ensure a large enough pool of similarly strong bidders (in some cases aided by granting privileges / 
discrimination) and avoid artificial market fragmentation (e.g. avoid splitting volumes into too many pools 
or baskets) 
 Avoid expected supply-demand ratios below 1.5:1, in such case consider a smaller auction volume 
 Implement participation enhancing measures (including an active communication strategy (in English), 
stakeholder consultations, at least 15-30 days consultation time on draft specifications, at least 60-90 
days for bid preparation) 
 
#3 Safeguard project realisation 
 Ask for binding bids 
 Winning projects should always receive at least their bid (the support level required to realise the project) 
 Implement both pre-qualification requirements and penalties (esp. material pre-qualification regarding 
project development stage and bid bonds)  
 
#4 Keep it simple  
 Define clear and simple selection criteria, use price as selection criterion 
 Avoid too harsh or confusing rules (such as stringent timelines, difficult to obtain documentation etc.) 
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 Use static auctions and consider pay-as-bid pricing if bidders and/or auctioneer are inexperienced, little 
cost or market information is available, and the competitive situation is uncertain43.  
 
#5 Provide abundant information to ensure a framework of certainty to potential investors 
 Avoid uncertainty and unwanted incentives for strategic behaviour by missing or unclear information that 
leaves room for interpretation and/or speculation by bidders 
 Publish a transparent and continuous auction schedule (to avoid ‘desperate’ bids) 
 Implement cost-based ceiling prices (acts also as a safeguard in case of low competition / too few bids) 
 Prioritise stakeholder consultations 
  
                                                     
43 Uniform pricing rule may e.g. incentivise unfavourable strategic bidding activity of multi-project bidders in cases of low competition. 
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16 AURES resources and tools 
FRAMING AND CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS MODEL-BASED ANALYSIS 
Overview of Design Elements for RES-E Auctions 
Assessment Criteria for RES-E Auctions 
Links Between Assessment of Design Elements 
Cash flow analysis of past RES auctions in Germany, 
Spain and Denmark 
Modelling of Renewable Energy Auctions: Game 
theoretic and Energy system Modelling 
AUCTION DESIGN ASPECTS EMPIRICAL ASPECTS OF AUCTIONS 
Assessment of Auction Types Suitable for 
RES-E 
Winner’s Curse in Discriminatory and 
Uniform Price Auctions 
Synthesis report on country case studies 
EU country studies: Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, UK 
Non-EU country studies: Brazil, China, South Africa, USA (California), 
Peru, Mexico, Chile, Zambia 
AUCTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES FUTURE IMPLEMENTATIONS 
Identification of alternative policy options to auctions  
Comparison of auctions and alternative policy options  
Hybrids and Transitions 
Introduction to the Case Studies 
EU country studies: Croatia, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, 
Netherlands/Denmark 
Policy cooperation cases: information on request 
POLICY SUPPORT TOOLBOX RECOMMENDATIONS 
AURES Auction Designer  
Cash Flow Model  
AURES Auction Academy 
 
Recommendations on the role of auctions in REDII 
Policy Memo 1: Secondary objectives in auctions 
Policy Memo 2: Pre-qualifications and penalties 
Policy Memo 3: Award types and auction outcomes 
Policy Memo 4: Competition in auctions 
MEDIA 
News / Blog Articles 
Newsletter archive 
Twitter 
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